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This volume explores whether and how children’s human rights law and other branches of 
international human rights law can inspire and enrich one another. Children’s rights law is often 
perceived and studied in isolation from the broader field of human rights law. This book 
examines to what extent this results in lost opportunities for children’s rights law as well as for 
general human rights law. Children’s rights law has a number of allegedly distinctive 
characteristics, such as the use of general principles, the emphasis on the ‘best interests of the 
child’, and the inclusion of ‘third parties’ (e.g. parents) in the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (CRC). The question arises whether these features could be a source of inspiration for 
general human rights law or other categorical branches of human rights law. This is explored in 
the first part of the volume. The second part reverses the question: could children’s rights law 
draw inspiration from developments in other branches of human rights law that focus on specific 
categories of rights holders, such as women, persons with disabilities, indigenous peoples, or 
older persons? Finally, the interaction between children’s rights law and human rights law – and 
the potential for isolation, inspiration or integration – may be coloured or determined by the 
thematic issue under consideration. Therefore the third part of the book studies the interplay 
between children’s rights law and human rights law in the context of specific topics: intra-family 
relations, LGBTI marginalization, undocumented migration, media, the right to a healthy 
environment, and human rights obligations of business. 
For the purposes of this volume, the editors understand the term 'integration' to refer to a 
deliberate effort from one branch of international human rights law to incorporate concepts, 
methods or practices that originate from another branch of international human rights law. The 
term 'inspiration' refers to cases in which direct incorporation of concepts or practices from 
another branch of international human rights law is not considered appropriate, but where some 
ideas or dynamics in one branch have nevertheless influenced or could influence ideas or 
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dynamics in another branch. Another way of looking at the difference between 'integration' and 
'inspiration' is that it is a matter of degree: 'inspiration' indicates light or indirect forms of 
influence, whereas 'integration' is used for more far-reaching and/or more direct forms of 
influence. In this sense, ‘integration’ may come down in certain cases to an ‘uncritical embrace’, 
whereas inspiration may suggest a more critical, deliberated and possibly selective interaction. 
Finally, the term 'isolation' is used to indicate a (deliberate or not) disregard of what is going on 
in other branches of international human rights law. 
 
2. Inspiring other human rights regimes  
 
The first part of the book examines the possible wider relevance of the most salient characteristic 
features of children’s rights law, for both general human rights law and other categorical 
branches of human rights law. In a first, umbrella chapter, Vandenhole identifies and examines 
five allegedly distinctive characteristics of the CRC: (i) the indivisibility of civil, political, 
economic, social and cultural rights; (ii) the inclusion of new substantive norms and elements, 
particularly as regards non-discrimination, the right to life, the concept of evolving capacities, 
and the right to education; (iii) the ‘best interests of the child’ concept; (iv) the use of general 
principles; and (v) the incorporation of ‘third parties’ as duty bearers in addition to the domestic 
state. He shows, among others, that some of these features have either never been (e.g. 
indivisibility) or are no longer (e.g. general principles) unique to children’s rights law. The 
following chapters discuss three of these characteristics – arguably those that have been most 
widely invoked and discussed in children’s rights practice and scholarship – in more depth: the 
best interests of the child (Stalford), the use of general principles (Lundy & Byrne) and the 
inclusion of third parties in the CRC (Ruggiero, Volonakis & Hanson). The authors analyse the 
historical and legal basis of these features, their current use in children’s rights law and beyond, 
and their potential future contribution to general human rights law and other specific areas of 
human rights law. The concept of ‘third parties’ is approached differently in the two chapters: 
whereas Ruggiero et al. focus their analysis on parents as third parties in the CRC, Vandenhole 
looks more broadly into non-state actors and extraterritorial obligations. 
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The overall assessment of the possible added value of these three features for other domains of 
human rights law runs rather parallel between the four authors. No calls for a direct integration or 
transplant of one or more of the features in other areas of human rights law are formulated. The 
potential for fruitful inspiration is appraised differently for each of the three characteristics. Most 
reluctance is expressed as regards using the best interests principle with respect to adult rights 
holders. Vandenhole and Stalford caution against ‘any naïve transplant’ and ‘extending the best 
interests too readily to other decision-making contexts’ respectively. The relevance of general 
principles for other branches of human rights law is more positively assessed, yet also in a 
qualified way, as contributors point to the weak legal and moral basis of general principles in 
children’s rights law (Vandenhole), and propose a set of criteria that could guide the 
identification and use of such principles (Lundy & Byrne). Finally, the inclusion of third parties 
as duty holders is evaluated as holding most promise for influencing other branches of human 
rights law, a conclusion that is supported both by an analysis of the rights, duties and 
responsibilities of parents in the CRC (Ruggiero et al.) and by an examination of the questions 
surrounding non-state actors’ and extraterritorial human rights obligations (Vandenhole). 
Two categorical human rights regimes are explicitly mentioned as possible candidates to be 
‘inspired’ by children’s rights law: the rights of persons with disabilities and the emerging regime 
on the rights of older persons. The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) 
has already drawn inspiration from children’s rights law, namely by codifying a list of general 
principles in its Article 3 (as discussed by both Lundy & Byrne, and Vandenhole). In the view of 
Lundy & Byrne, the principles in the CRPD are too numerous (eight) – ‘so all-encompassing that 
they become dilutionary’ -, which risks impeding their effective functioning. They prefer the 
CRC Committee’s approach, where the more limited number of principles (four) allows ‘for a 
substantive and focused body of work to develop over time’ – an approach that also better fits the 
reality of limited resources of the UN treaty bodies. Forward-looking, Ruggiero et al. suggest that 
disability rights law could learn lessons from children’s rights law when developing its approach 
to third parties, limited in the CRPD to a reference to ‘families and caregivers’ as an additional 
target group of state measures to prevent exploitation, violence and abuse, next to persons with 
disabilities themselves (Article 16, 2). In order to conceptualize the legal position of these 
families and caregivers, the authors propose that the concept of ‘responsibilities’ might offer a 
useful point of departure, influenced by the way ‘parental responsibilities’ have become 
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understood in children’s rights law as ‘limited and functional rights aimed at the fulfilment of the 
rights of the child’. The older persons’ rights regime could, in their view, equally benefit from 
this concept of ‘responsibilities’, if third parties are included in its legal framework. The rights of 
older persons are also mentioned by Vandenhole as an instance where developing a set of general 
principles could be usefully envisaged.i Stalford does not single out particular categorical regimes 
of human rights as possible destinations of inspiration, and instead discusses the possible 
application of ‘best interests’ in relation to adult human rights in general. She does describe, 
though, how the concept has been used (and abused) ‘in a clinical health care context for adults 
deemed to lack capacity to make decisions for themselves’. 
The remainder of this section succinctly reviews the arguments put forward by the authors in 
favour of and against a broader (adapted) use of best interests, general principles, and the 
inclusion of third parties. 
Best interests 
Stalford and Vandenhole both note that applying best interests in respect of other so-called 
vulnerable groups of rights holders seems appealing at first sight. Nevertheless, they warn against 
a too ready appropriation of this concept in adult human rights contexts, on the basis of various 
arguments. Both authors refer to the already opaque and indeterminate meaning of the concept in 
children’s rights law, which leads to inconsistent and even opposing outcomes – something 
which would risk to be exacerbated if best interests were broadened towards other human rights 
domains. In addition, Stalford emphasises the child-specificity of the concept, in three ways: it 
serves to make children’s interests visible in an adult-dominated world; it offers a way to address 
possible clashes between interests of adults and the interests of the child; and – from a utilitarian 
perspective – paying attention to the child’s best interests enhances general societal welfare. This 
conceptualisation of best interests makes it difficult, she argues, to extend its application to the 
realm of adult rights holders. Such an extension could lead, in the words of Parker, to ‘an 
artificial and sterile universalism’, dissolving the distinctiveness of the concept. Moreover, 
Stalford cautions that broadening the use of best interests could undermine the concept’s original 
objective, of protecting children’s welfare. Such extension also risks ‘entrenching a 
predominantly paternalistic model of best interests from which, for many years now, activists 
have been trying to extricate children’s rights’. Finally, Vandenhole and Stalford seem to differ in 
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their view of the weight to be given to the best interests of the child (as prevailing or as (only) 
carrying greater weight in a balancing exercise). Whereas Vandenhole points to a lack of clarity 
on this issue, for instance in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, for 
Stalford it is clear that best interests do not imply a trump card for the interests of the child, but 
that they accommodate the rights of adults. Albeit on the basis of a somewhat different 
argumentation (unclear weight versus inherent consideration of adult rights), the conclusion of 
the two authors is similar, namely that this argumentation provides another reason why 
transposing best interests to other human rights regimes does not seem desirable. 
 
General principles 
Tracing the history of the identification of the general principles by the CRC Committee, Lundy 
& Byrne disclose the difficulty of finding a logical explanation of why precisely Articles 2, 3, 6 
and 12 CRC were elevated to the status of general principles. Vandenhole also points to the weak 
legal and theoretical grounding of the principles, and the fact that the principles of non-
discrimination and participation are not child-specific. Notwithstanding their fuzzy origin, Lundy 
& Byrne show how the general principles have been predominant in children’s rights 
implementation efforts by state parties and other duty bearers, in advocacy by NGOs and civil 
society, and in academic scholarship. Although the general principles thus seem to have 
contributed to an enhanced understanding and acceptance of the CRC, the authors point out that 
the key role attached to the general principles may also have led to a reduced attention for other 
substantive treaty provisions. To assess the added value of the concept of general principles, 
Lundy & Byrne then proceed to investigate other human rights treaties, adopted prior to and after 
the CRC. Although they identify provisions in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)ii as well as in the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination that could serve as general principles, they 
also wonder ‘what if anything has been lost in their absence’. For it can be argued that the lack of 
general principles has not considerably impacted the implementation of both treaties. On the 
other hand, as already indicated above, the actual inclusion of general principles in the CRPD 
does not seem to make a substantial contribution to the convention’s implementation either. In 
their conclusion, Lundy & Byrne formulate some criteria that could guide the identification of 
convention-specific general principles, including the criterion that the principle has a ‘clear basis 
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that enables [it] to apply across the other substantive provisions of the Convention and to do so in 
a way that enhances implementation’, and the criterion that the principle ‘addresses a barrier to 
the realisation and/or a route to fulfilment of the rights of the protected groups and individuals’. 
Moreover, they submit that the ‘sum of the principles must … be greater than the parts’. Lundy & 
Byrne and Vandenhole thus concur that, when carefully selected and well grounded, general 
principles are an interesting feature of children’s rights law that could inspire other human rights 
fields. 
 
Inclusion of third parties 
A final distinctive characteristic of the CRC is that it breaks through the traditional binary 
relationship in human rights law of individual rights holders versus the state, by introducing 
‘third parties’ – more specifically parents and caregivers – as holding ‘rights, duties and 
responsibilities’. On the basis of their detailed analysis of the status of parenthood in the CRC, 
Ruggiero et al. identify some advantages and risks of including third parties in other human rights 
regimes. Two arguments plead against such inclusion. First, bringing in third parties may lead to 
controversy and polarization, as the authors illustrate with their account of the dichotomous 
nature of the relationship between parental rights and children’s rights in the United States. Such 
‘dichotomous vision consistently downplays the contentious nature of the relationship between 
the family and the State’. Second, it has been argued that the triangular relationship in the CRC 
has led to obscuring the legal obligations of states parties as regards the rights of the child. Critics 
of the campaign against corporal punishment have argued that this campaign allowed states to 
hide their direct obligations to combat structural economic inequalities, by shifting the 
responsibility onto parents. On the other hand, Rugierro et al. suggest that other human rights 
regimes - in particular the rights of persons with disabilities and the rights of older persons – 
could draw inspiration from the ‘conciliatory perspective’ as adopted in the CRC, ‘which 
prescribes that a balance needs to be made between the rights of different actors involved by 
distributing responsibilities, duties and rights among parents/caretakers and the State towards the 
promotion and realization of an abstract public good, i.e. the child’s well-being’.  
Vandenhole draws other, yet complementary conclusions from the inclusion of third parties in the 
CRC. In his view, the reference to parents in the CRC may contribute to ‘opening up the duty-
bearer side of human rights law, in order to include other actors than the state’. He pleads for a 
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more consistent use of terminology though, to indicate the legally binding nature of a certain 
norm, and warns that the relationship between the obligations and responsibilities of the various 
actors should be further clarified. Secondly, the multiple references in the CRC to international 
assistance and co-operation indicate that the CRC goes beyond the domestic state as the only 
statist duty-holder. As regards the conceptualisation of the responsibilities and obligations of non-
state actors as well as of extraterritorial obligations of the domestic state, Vandenhole regrets, 
however, that the CRC Committee has not yet fully developed this potential. He refers to the 
work of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) as a possible source 
of inspiration for children’s rights law in this respect. The CESCR is not the only human rights 
treaty body from which children’s rights could learn, though, as is explored in the second part. 
 
3. Learning from other categorical human rights regimes 
 
The chapters in part two look into other categorical human rights regimes – women’s rights; 
rights of persons with disabilities; indigenous peoples’ rights; and rights of older persons, in order 
to examine how these regimes may inspire the human rights of children (and vice versa). 
  
The authors were asked to have their chapters guided by two sets of questions, the first more 
analytical, the second more normative: 
 
(i) What are distinctive characteristics of the human rights protection of the category of rights 
holders under consideration? What are best practices? What are pitfalls to be avoided?  
 
(ii) Which general lessons may be drawn from these (sub)disciplines about the protection of the 
human rights of a specific group? Which aspects may inspire the development of children’s rights 
law specifically?  
 
In the course of this exercise, it became clear that challenges may be common to the categorical 
regime under scrutiny and children’s human rights (that is in particular the case with regard to 
rights of indigenous peoples), or that children’s rights may be a more prominent source of 
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inspiration for other categorical regimes (under construction), as the experience with the rights of 
older persons seems to suggest. 
 
In what follows, we will look into the most salient distinctive characteristics of each of the three 
categorical human rights regimes under scrutiny, and draw some inspirational conclusions for 
children’s rights law. 
A preliminary caveat is in order, though. The distinctiveness of categorical human rights regimes 
for women, persons with disabilities, indigenous peoples and older persons must be put into 
perspective: as Brems points out, all are considered as vulnerable groups and all face the 
challenge of balancing protection with emancipation or independence. Moreover, 
intersectionality rather than a particular unique status seems to really matter in practice. So while 
some of the categorical human rights regimes may have unique characteristics, they are all 
emancipation rights, Brems submits in her chapter on women’s rights, that address similar 
challenges. What unites emancipation rights is that they strongly matter in horizontal relations 
and require cultural change. The realisation of such a ‘cultural’ paradigm shift seems most 
challenging where children are concerned: other categories of so-called vulnerable persons 
demand that they are not treated like children, hence reinforcing the stereotypes of vulnerability 
and incapacity that tend to dominate in discourse on children.iii An interesting avenue for further 
research on emancipation rights may be the area of work. Whereas the right to work (in dignity) 
has made quite some leeway with regard to women, persons with disabilities and older persons, 
developments with regard to children are going in the opposite direction of a ban on all child 
labour, rather than of the recognition of the right to work in dignity. Indigenous peoples’ rights 
lend support to defining childhood not only in terms of biological age, and in this way possibly 
too to the recognition of children of a right to work in dignity. 
Women’s rights together with indigenous peoples’ rights seem the most different regimes among 
these emancipation rights. The commonalities of children’s rights, rights of persons with 
disabilities and rights of older persons indeed stand out in the analysis of these respective 
regimes: for example, for all three, the debate on capacity rages on, whereas with regard to 
women’s rights and indigenous peoples’ rights, the capacity debate seems over. Children’s rights, 
rights of persons with disabilities and rights of older persons face a fluid delineation of the 
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category they are covering. Admittedly, the latter characterizes indigenous peoples’ rights as 
well, whereas it is pretty clear who are considered ‘women’.iv Brems points out: ‘The 
emancipatory challenge of children’s rights lies in making people see not only children’s inherent 
vulnerability, but also their inherent capacity for autonomy, and the gradual development of that 
capacity. In that sense, children’s rights as emancipation rights are both similar to and different 
from women’s rights as emancipation rights.’ (Chapter 5, this volume).  
Let us now turn to some of the most salient particularities in comparison to children’s rights, of 
each of the categorical regimes under scrutiny. 
Women’s rights 
The women’s rights regime may well be the area where the problematic nature of protection 
dynamics has been most clearly exposed and addressed. As Brems points out, the ‘emphasis on 
vulnerability and protection [is seen] as an expression of paternalism that reinforces gendered 
stereotypes and that contributes to denying women equal opportunities.’ (Chapter 5, this volume). 
In the struggle for realizing women’s rights as human rights, the emphasis is much more on 
empowerment and autonomy, and hardly on vulnerability. Protective measures for children have 
not been delegitimized to the same extent; to the contrary, the very success of children’s rights 
seems to be grounded in the generalized perception of children as vulnerable and the widespread 
support for maximum protection of children. So, in challenging this myopic emphasis on 
children’s autonomy, children’s rights may benefit from women’s rights. The need to bring about 
cultural change to address stereotypes or prejudices, means that action has also to be taken in 
horizontal relations. Brems believes that this is the key learning point for children’s rights: 
cultural perceptions of and practices towards children need to be de-normalized, which 
necessitates the inclusion of a specific provision on the state’s obligation to work for cultural 
change similar to the one in article 5 (a) CEDAW. Such a provision should function as a self-
standing obligation, but also as an additional general principle that guides the interpretation of all 
CRC provisions. A cue could be taken from the work on harmful cultural practices, but efforts 




Rights of persons with disabilities 
While acknowledging that in a pessimistic reading any innovative aspect of the CRPD may be 
repudiated at the general level and in the particular context of the rights of children (with 
disabilities), Sandland mainly emphasizes the major shift in the CRPD’s underpinning model or 
paradigm. The CRPD is premised on a holistic social model of disability. The shift to a social 
model of disability (whereby disability is not seen as an inherent deficiency, but rather as the 
result of the interaction between persons with impairments and attitudinal and environmental 
barriers, see the Preamble to the CRPD) echoes very much the need for cultural change as argued 
by Brems. But both authors (and possibly both fields) disagree on the extent to which 
developments in their own field could or should be paralleled in children’s rights. Brems 
emphasizes the persistent difference between women’s rights and children’s rights. She argues 
that ‘the majority of children have a capacity for autonomy that is significantly lower than that of 
adults’, and that ‘[t]aking children’s capacity for autonomy seriously also means recognising the 
limits of that capacity.’ The optimal balance between protection rights and autonomy rights will 
therefore differ for women and children. In disability law, the role that the concept of ‘capacity’, 
and third-party decision-making in the ‘best interests’ of persons found to ‘lack’ capacity used to 
play, may be argued to have been replaced. Through the notion of supported decision-making, the 
assumption now prevails that capacity to make one’s own decisions is always attainable, if the 
person with disability is given the necessary assistance.  
Sandland submits that the rights of persons with disabilities raise ‘questions regarding the 
continued viability of an essentialist, status-based, non-socialised, construction of children and 
their rights lack of any comparable “social model of childhood”’, and invites to ponder about the 
effects of a ‘social model of childhood’. For one, such a social model of childhood would 
challenge ‘the continued desirability of a role of ‘capacity’ and ‘best interests’ as mechanisms for 
making decisions in relation to children’ (Chapter 6, this volume). In other words, the 
CRPD raises the questions of whether (i) it is not now time to shift from a status-based to 
a functionality-based understanding of the limitations that simply being a ‘child’ as a 
matter of legal status places on a young person in terms of their abilities to make 
decisions for themselves, and; (ii) there should be, if not an abandonment of the best 
interests principle, then at least the severance of that principle from a substituted 
11 
 
judgement framework for those children found to have functional capacity and its 
attachment instead to a supported decision-making model. (Chapter 6, this volume). 
The CRPD also adopts a holistic approach to rights, which entails the undermining of traditional 
divisions within orthodox human rights discourse between types of rights (in particular civil and 
political versus economic, social and cultural rights). The typology impacts the general obligation 
incumbent on States: the former are to be realised immediately, the latter only progressively 
subject to the availability of resources. In Sandland’s view, the CRPD constructs ‘civil and 
political rights as being interwoven with economic, social and cultural rights’, and thereby 
‘understands the legal subject as being interdependent and relational’: ‘we all need effective 
economic, social and cultural rights if we are truly to be able to exercise our civil or political 
rights.’ This approach ‘undermines the liberal legal subject, seen in political and civil rights terms 
as being independent, isolated and autonomous.’ (Chapter 6, this volume). Although this 
comprehensiveness, as it has been called in children’s rights literature, has also been identified as 
characteristic of children’s rights, the CRPD seems to push it to a higher level, and children’s 
rights may learn from this. 
Finally, Sandland identifies some new rights, and the extension and reconfiguration of existing 
rights for children (with disabilities): e.g. the evolving capacities of the child and the right to 
participate effectively in society may have been elevated to general principles; the right to 
physical and mental integrity is explicitly recognized and the right to life better protected; and the 
right to physical and mental integrity may provide leverage for access to all spaces open to the 
public, including private spaces. 
Indigenous peoples’ rights 
Desmet identifies three areas in which children’s rights may learn from indigenous peoples’ 
rights: space for flexibility in the definition of the group; the consequences of romanticised 
constructions; and interpretative guidance for participation and consent. 
The field of indigenous peoples’ rights uses flexible conceptions of indigenous peoples, with self-
identification as a central element. The CRC on the other hand employs a static definition of 
children. However, children grow up in very diverse geographical, cultural and socio-economic 
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contexts. A general upper age limit at eighteen is quite Eurocentric, and may negatively affect 
certain rights of children, such as a right to work in dignity. Desmet therefore pleads for a 
multidimensional understanding of children, which does not exclusively focus on chronological 
age; but also take into account self-identification as well as psychological and contextual factors. 
Secondly, indigenous peoples and children may be said to have been constructed in a similar 
way, from historically marginalized to romanticised and idealised today. The romanticised 
constructions of indigenous peoples and children may have a negative impact on rights 
protection, and may moreover lead to a lack of critical scientific analysis. Desmet challenges 
these essentializing tendencies and calls for an increase in efforts ‘to unveil assumptions and 
constructions that essentialize indigenous peoples and children, as well as the impact of these 
constructions on research, policy and practice.’ (Chapter 7, this volume). 
Thirdly, notions of consultation and consent are legally well-developed in the field of indigenous 
peoples’ rights. Indigenous peoples’ rights can inspire children’s rights law in furthering the 
theoretical, legal and practical development of the collective dimension of the right of children to 
be heard (including aspects of representation), and in fleshing out the attributes of the emerging 
right of children to consent (namely free, prior and informed). 
Rights of older persons 
The field of rights of older persons is the only one where intersectionality is excluded: children 
can never belong to this category while being children. Moreover, the codification of the human 
rights of older persons is still in a rather early stage (no treaty has as yet been adopted), which 
may explain why the question of inspiration is more prominently in the reverse direction, i.e. 
which learning points does the CRC contain for the rights of older persons. In Chapter 8, Habbig, 
Hoefmans and De Hert suggest three points of inspiration. First of all, the paradigm shift that we 
discussed earlier (from vulnerability to autonomy), although not fully realized in the CRC, is 
clearly also relevant to address the stereotypes associated with ageing. Moreover, and quite 
typical of the CRC, the use of principles in addition to rights is believed to be a good practice. 
Thirdly, the concept of evolving capacities and the retreating role of parents or other caregivers 
may be of relevance to the rights of older persons, although it cannot be simply transplanted: 
whereas children gradually develop ‘towards full capability in decision-making, older persons 
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often see a reverse development.’ But the key questions are similar: how to balance and facilitate 
as much autonomy as possible while growing more dependent? And how to define the evolving 
role, responsibilities and obligations of informal and formal caregivers? 
Children’s rights may learn from the older persons’ rights regime, as they could from the 
indigenous peoples’ rights regime, how to use a more variable age limit: whether a person is 
labeled as ‘aged’, ‘old’ or ‘elderly’ depends on the cultural context, economic considerations and 
the respective life expectancy, and such a more open-ended approach could be beneficial for 
children’s rights too. 
Although too early to tell, the authors express the hope that if the older persons’ rights regime 
‘strikes the right balance between protection and emancipation, this could be an argument to look 
more closely at the parallel debate in children’s human rights law’, in particular with regard to the 
right to work. 
Finally, age-based discrimination has been developed within the older persons’ rights regime, but 
remains by and large a blind spot in children’s rights law. The prohibited ground of age is 
conceptually not yet well developed in children’s human rights law, and may benefit from 
developments within the older persons’ rights regime. 
In sum, all five regimes are part of a struggle for emancipation. Women’s rights and disability 
rights seem to have been most successful in introducing a paradigm shift, away from 
protectionism to a better acknowledgement of autonomy. Authors disagree though whether 
children’s rights should make a similar shift, towards recognition of full capacity of children, and 
a supported decision-making model, as one reading of disability rights suggests. Disability rights 
may also be most inspirational in intertwining civil and political rights, and economic, social and 
cultural rights, and hence in imposing immediate obligations with regard to economic, social and 
cultural rights. Indigenous peoples’ rights and rights of older persons have adopted a flexible 
notion of the category concerned, which may inspire children’s rights to move beyond a one size 
fits all approach to the upper limit of 18. Finally, more explicit engagement with age 




3. Situating children’s human rights vis-à-vis general human rights in concrete contexts 
In the third part of the book, authors zoom in on a thematic area, to examine the interplay 
between children’s rights law and human rights law. They describe the state of affairs as to the 
relation between children’s rights law and human rights law in the particular thematic area. More 
specifically they look for signs that mark this relationship as one of either ‘isolation’, 
‘inspiration’ or ‘integration’. In the concrete reality of a specific field, does it seem that children’s 
rights law impacts upon general human rights law or vice versa? In addition to these analytical 
questions, authors were asked to ponder also some normative questions: what are promising or 
desirable avenues for further development of the role of children’s human rights law vis-à-vis 
general human rights law in this thematic issue? Should there be isolation, inspiration or 
integration, and if so, how?  
The thematic areas that are examined in this manner are family relations (Chapter 9), LGBTQI 
marginalization (Chapter 10), undocumented migration (Chapter 11), media (Chapter 12), 
environmental protection (Chapter 13) and corporate responsibility for human rights (Chapter 
14). From a normative point of view, all chapters argue in favour of increased inspiration or 
integration between children’s human rights and other field of human rights law, with some 
stating that children’s human rights should borrow certain elements from other human rights 
fields, and others claiming that other fields would do well to learn from developments in 
children’s human rights law or to include a focus on children’s rights in future normative 
development.  
3.1. Enriching children’s rights with insights and concerns from other human rights fields 
Focusing on the family sphere, Titia Loenen examines (in Chapter 9) how much credit CEDAW 
and CRC give to each other in this sphere. Loenen is satisfied that CEDAW provisions pay 
adequate attention to children’s rights through explicit references to the ‘best interests of the child 
principle’. Yet she assesses the limited attention to gender in the CRC, including in the work of 
the CRC Committee, as insufficient. The CRC Committee is integrating a gender concern by 
introducing a regular mention of the ‘girl child’. Yet where parents are concerned, the CRC 
Committee is generally mute on gender, and prefers the use of gender-neutral language. Loenen 
draws our attention to the fact that challenging the gender stereotypes and gendered role patterns 
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in the family holds a central position in the CEDAW’s theory of change toward gender equality. 
Indeed, the CEDAW Committee ‘links the gendered division of family roles with the overall 
inferior position of women in society, their economic dependence, poverty and lack of social, 
economic and political power’ (Chapter 9, this volume). For Loenen, the fact that the CRC 
emphasizes the shared responsibility of parents for the upbringing of their children is not 
sufficient. In addition, she states that the CRC Committee should explicitly address the gendered 
dimensions of this shared responsibility. By recognizing that women are often the primary 
caretakers of children, the CRC could, according to Loenen, contribute to the empowerment of 
women. At the same time she notes that where the CRC and its Committee do pay specific 
attention to parents’ gender, i.e. in the context of motherhood as a biological function, this 
sometimes results in the instrumentalisation of women, as their interests seem to be subordinated 
to those of children. Interestingly, Loenen points at a procedural approach that may be best 
practice in terms of human rights integration: the joint General recommendation/General 
comment of the CEDAW Committee and the CRC on harmful practices integrates a women’s 
rights approach and a children’s rights approach in a manner that Loenen considers optimal. 
Women’s rights and their focus on relations within the family are a long-standing theme in 
human rights law, amongst others because the adoption of CEDAW predates that of the CRC 
with a decade. Loenen’s argument is therefore for the integration within children’s rights of the 
specialized knowledge and experience of a mature specialized system and its expert body. On the 
other hand, Ivana Isailovic’ chapter on children’s rights in relation to LGBTI marginalisation 
(Chapter 10) argues for the integration in children’s rights of novel rights protection standards 
that have only partially gained full recognition in international law as binding standards. Indeed 
one can imagine a future LGBTI rights regime comparable to the specialized human rights 
regimes for women, children, persons with disabilities etc. Yet for now, LGBTI rights as 
international human rights are found mostly in soft law and in the jurisprudence of supranational 
monitoring bodies. Isailovic points out that, on account of their initial focus on sexuality, LGBTI 
rights have long been conceptualized as adult rights, and the emergence of children in this 
landscape is a recent development. Until recently, children’s rights have been mobilized mostly 
to counter LGBTI rights. Yet today, the CRC Committee is starting to address LGBTI rights in 
its General Comments and Concluding Observations. Isailovic’ central argument is that the 
CRC’s potential to protect the rights of LGBTI children or children raised by LGBTI parents may 
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or may not be realized depending on the willingness to embrace new interpretations of CRC 
provisions. Such new interpretations would have to take into account soft law such as the 
Yogyakarta Principles as well as interpretations of other human rights instruments that do justice 
to the experiences of LGBTI individuals. Isailovic builds this argument through three cases: self-
determination rights of intersex children under article 12 CRC, the interpretation of ‘the best 
interests of the child’ (article 3 CRC) in family life cases, and addressing bullying, intimidation, 
and negative stereotypes in the school context under article 29 CRC.  
 
3.2. Enriching other human rights fields with insights from or a focus on children’s rights 
The chapters by van Kalmthout on environmental rights (Chapter 13) and by Erdem Türkelli on 
business and human rights (Chapter 14) likewise discuss dynamic and highly topical fields of 
human rights law in which normative development is still ongoing. Yet contrary to Isailovic, they 
argue not for the integration of general human rights law developments into children’s rights, but 
instead want children’s rights to be taken on board in the development of general human rights 
law.  
For Erdem Türkelli this point of view is based on the finding that, in the area of business and 
human rights, recent children’s rights (soft law) instruments have been developed that have been 
strongly inspired by general soft law instruments in this field. Indeed, both the Children’s Rights 
and Business Principles and the General Comment 16 of the CRC Committee are heavily inspired 
by the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGP). What is more, the CRC 
Committee’s General Comment goes further in that it corrects or ‘improves’ the UNGP from a 
children’s rights point of view. In that respect, one might argue that what Isailovic would like to 
see happen in the field of LGBTI rights, i.e. the reinterpretation of children’s rights in line with 
recent developments in a specific field of general human rights, has in fact happened in the area 
of business and human rights. Yet Erdem Türkelli deplores the fact that the operationalisation of 
both frameworks takes place in isolation from one another. The main discussion – in particular on 
a potential future binding treaty- takes place in the general human rights framework, and ‘the 
momentum on children’s rights and business has not yet been translated into a tangible 
integration of children’s rights into the broader human rights discussions on transnational 
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obligations in a meaningful way’ (Chapter 14, this volume). This is why she argues that the trend 
should now be reversed, and that after the integration of business and human rights in the 
children’s rights framework, children’s rights should now be integrated in the general human 
rights frameworks addressing businesses. 
In the field of environmental rights, discussed by Danielle van Kalmthout, developments that 
may lead to the recognition of a binding human right to a healthy environment, have so far not 
sufficiently included children’s specific protection needs. Van Kalmthout therefore argues in 
favour of integrating children’s needs and interests in these debates. Yet, contrary to Erdem 
Türkelli, her vision is not one in which children’s rights would be incorporated in a general 
instrument or provision. Instead, for van Kalmthout the integration of children’s rights in the 
debates about a right to a healthy environment, should lead to the separate recognition – in the 
context of the CRC- of a child right to a healthy environment in addition to a general right to the 
same. In her analysis of the CRC, van Kalmthout identifies numerous provisions that have been 
interpreted to include some aspects of a child right to a healthy environment and/or that might be 
interpreted in a way that would help shape such a right. Yet – and in this her position differs from 
that of Isailovic- she does not consider reinterpretation a satisfactory solution. In addition to 
looking for the strongest possible guarantees, this position may in part be motivated by the 
importance of the symbolism of recognition that a separate provision can deliver. 
Both Erdem Türkelli and van Kalmthout conceive of the integration of children’s rights in 
general human rights as a way of providing better protection for the human rights of children. 
Other authors have however argued that certain interpretations that have been developed in the 
context of children’s rights, may serve as an inspiration to improve general human rights for all, 
including adults. This line of argument is developed in the chapters on media and undocumented 
migration. 
In Chapter 12, Eva Lievens analyses in detail how the European and UN human rights regimes 
approach children as consumers, participants and subjects of the media. The combination of hard 
law, soft law and the interpretations of supranational human rights bodies, results in a very 
sophisticated regime. Built mainly on three CRC provisions (arts 12, 13 and 17) it is a three-
dimensional approach, including protective measures, in addition to obligations to provide, as 
well as an emphasis on participation. This is a much richer framework than the general human 
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rights framework that applies to adults in relation to the media, and that includes mainly negative 
rights. Lievens therefore argues that adult rights holders could benefit from enhanced human 
rights protection, if the children’s rights regime on the media were to inspire the general human 
rights regime in this field. In addition to positive state obligations, this would entail a right to 
participate in media governance processes. Moreover, the multi-stakeholder approach of 
children’s rights – conferring responsibilities not only on the state, but also on parents and the 
media- could prove a useful model to concretize in human rights terms the responsibilities of 
‘third parties’ in the media sector, ‘such as journalists, internet service providers, search engines 
or social network site providers’ (Chapter 12, this volume). 
The analysis of Julie Ryngaert and Wouter Vandenhole of the use of ‘vulnerability’ concepts in 
the context of the rights of undocumented migrants (Chapter 11), likewise reveals the potential of 
sophisticated rights reasoning that was developed for children’s rights, to have broader 
application. The concept of vulnerability is mobilised in both children’s rights law and general 
human rights law to single out individuals or groups that need enhanced protection or priority 
treatment. In general human rights law, children are often considered more vulnerable than adults 
in this context. The detailed analysis of Ryngaert and Vandenhole shows that the vulnerability 
concept that is applied (though not always) by the CRC Committee is significantly more 
sophisticated than that which is used by general supranational human rights bodies, in particular 
the European Court of Human Rights. The sophistication concerns the combination of 
vulnerability and autonomy, a contextual understanding of vulnerability, and attention to 
diversity within children as a vulnerable group. Ryngaert and Vandenhole argue, on the basis of 
empirical studies, that the CRC Committee’s nuanced vulnerability approach is more suitable for 
application to the rights of undocumented migrant children than the European Court’s approach. 
This is because each of the nuances introduced by the CRC Committee reflects the reality of 
undocumented migrant children. Ryngaert and Vandenhole however do not simply make the 
argument that the CRC Committee has more expertise on children’s rights and experiences than 
general human rights bodies, and that therefore general bodies ‘doing children’s rights’ should 
model their approach after that of the CRC Committee. Instead, they argue, again with empirical 
support, that the CRC Committee’s nuanced vulnerability approach is also better suited for 
addressing the human rights of undocumented migrant adults. They claim that this is a less 
reductionist approach that better reflects the humanity of undocumented migrants. An additional 
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benefit of this approach, they argue, is that it does away with the dichotomy that pitches 
undocumented migrant children and their rights against adults (who may even be their parents) in 
the same situation. In Ryngaert and Vandenhole’s interpretation, what may at first sight seem to 
be a distinctive feature of children’s rights protection, is reframed as a state-of-the-art 
interpretation of general human rights, which happens to be developed in the context of 
children’s rights.  
 
3.3. Reasons for pro-integration viewpoints 
Across chapters, the main reasons for normative positions in favour of increased inspiration or 
integration between children’s human rights law and general human rights law or other specific 
‘branches’ of human rights law, are threefold: increasing rights protection, improving rights 
protection, and doing away with conflicts between the human rights of children and adults. 
Increased rights protection for children is the main driver of van Kalmthout’s argument: the 
movement toward formal recognition of a binding right to a healthy environment should, in her 
opinion, equally lead to the recognition of a parallel children’s right. The reason is simple: it has 
been shown empirically that children suffer more than adults from environmental degradation. 
Hence, children need enhanced environmental rights protection.  
Increased rights protection for both adults and children is what Loenen and Isailovic are after. 
Loenen aims to enlist the CRC’s assistance for the realisation of one of the central missions of 
CEDAW, which is the elimination of harmful gender stereotypes and role patterns. This approach 
seems to proceed from an integrated view of human rights that endorses an ‘all hands on deck’ 
approach, in which specialized human rights systems should avoid a narrow focus on their area of 
special interest, but should instead also strive to contribute to optimal human rights protection 
overall. Isailovic is dealing with a topic that is in the frontline of the dynamic development of 
international human rights law. Injustice done to LGBTI individuals is finally being recognized 
and brought under the label of human rights violations. While this process is still not completed, 
and is also encountering resistance, Isailovic has a vision in which the focused attention for 
LGBTI rights in specialized instruments goes hand in hand with their mainstreaming in other 
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fields of human rights. Children’s rights are particularly salient in this respect for several reasons, 
which include the vulnerability of LGBTI children, the importance of educating the younger 
generation if one wants to generate a change of minds, and finally the abuse of children’s rights 
by those who object to LGBTI rights. 
Improved rights protection for children or for all as a goal of human rights integration, can refer 
to the objective of avoiding negative side effects of current –‘un-integrated’- developments in 
human rights law. In that vein, Ryngaert and Vandenhole propose that general human rights law 
improves its concept of vulnerability in relation to undocumented migrants so as to avoid 
reductionism, stigmatisation and disempowerment that may be the by-products of an unnuanced 
focus on vulnerability. Likewise, Erdem Türkelli proposes integration of children’s rights into 
mainstream debates on business and human rights, to bypass the undesirable effect of the 
opposite movement, which had resulted in isolating ‘children’s rights and business’ from the 
momentum on human rights and business. Even without the identification of undesirable side-
effects of the current regime, a comparison with children’s rights may lead to identifying 
sophisticated arguments or concepts that can improve general human rights. In the media context, 
Lievens identified participation rights and the multi-stakeholder approach as promising features 
of the children’s rights approach in this regard. 
Finally, several authors conceive of the integration between children’s rights and general human 
rights as a way of appeasing tensions between the rights of children and those of adults. Loenen 
points out that the CRC Committee instrumentalizes biological motherhood at the service of 
children, disregarding the interests of mothers. In her vision, an integrated approach in which the 
CRC Committee strengthens its gendered analysis would avoid such statements as a blanket 
recommendation for mothers to breastfeed their children between 6 and 24 months without 
considering the implications for the women concerned. An integrated approach would thus not 
automatically favour one side in a situation that is characterized by conflicting rights claims, but 
rather attempt to reconcile both. In other situations, what appears to be a tension between rights 
of adults and those of children, may disappear as a result of the adoption of an integrated rights 
approach. Ryngaert and Vandenhole argue that the adoption of a nuanced vulnerability concept 
for both adult and minor undocumented migrants would deconstruct the dichotomy between the 
two categories that now leads to different rulings on children and adults in similar situations. In 
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the field of LGBTI rights, Isailovic argues that integration of LGBTI rights thinking in the 
interpretation of children’s rights would dissolve false conflicts between children’s rights and 
LGBTI rights that have often functioned as obstacles to LGBTI rights recognition. 
 
Conclusion: looking beyond 
Following the development of different categorical and thematic human rights regimes, human 
rights scholarship has become increasingly specialised and departmentalised. Academics too 
rarely look beyond their niche of expertise. 
This book shows, however, that much can be learnt from taking off our blinkers and widening 
our gaze. Realising human rights – both in general and with respect to particular groups – may be 
well served by analysing more in depth the conceptual and practical developments in 
certain/other subfields of international human rights law. This does not imply that innovative 
concepts or distinctive approaches should be blindly transposed to other fields. It does mean that 
carefully analysing the benefits and drawbacks of the particularities of one human rights regime, 
may contribute to the enhanced effectiveness of human rights law as a whole and also lead to a 
more integrated experience of human rights. 
It is the hope of the editors that this book will not ‘remain in isolation’, but inspire other scholars 
to ask similar questions from points of departure other than children’s rights law.  
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i See also Habbig, Hoefmans & De Hert, chapter 8 in this volume. 
ii For instance Article 5 CEDAW, see also Brems, chapter 5 in this volume. 
iii As Desmet points out, children have also been depicted as noble savages, which seems to show the persistence of 
stereotypes of indigenous peoples as well. She nonetheless demonstrates that the paradigm shift for indigenous 
peoples has been more or less successful. It may make sense, therefore, to better understand the reasons for that 
success, in order to realize a similar paradigm shift for children. 
iv With the exception of intersex persons. 
